Een mooi verslag van onderstaande:
Bron:
http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs ... hmidt.html
Medical Support and Evacuation for the 112th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division, in the Battle for Schmidt
Medical Support and Evacuation for the 112th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division, in the Battle for Schmidt
The attack of the 28th Infantry Division on the town of Schmidt in the Hürtgen Forest in early November 1944 occupies a special place in the history of the U.S. Army’s operations against Nazi Germany in World War II. Fought under awful weather conditions over very difficult and heavily-forested terrain along the KallRiver on the German-Belgian border south of Aachen, Germany, the Battle of Schmidt was one of the bloodiest and most wasteful American operations of the war in Europe. The 109th, 110th, and 112th Infantry Regiments of the 28th Infantry Division and attached units were all engaged in these operations. However, the 112th Infantry bore the brunt of the fighting and casualties in the towns of Vossenack, Kommerscheidt, and Schmidt and along the Kall River Trail that connected Vossenack with Kommerscheidt and Schmidt to the east of the Kall River.
Within days, medical personnel of the 112th Infantry completed these reports which provide a graphic picture of the challenges that regimental and battalion medical personnel faced in caring for and evacuating the wounded and sick soldiers under such appalling conditions. Capts. John S. Howe and William J. Fox, 2d Information and Historical Service, European Theater of Operations, subsequently interviewed many members of the 28th Infantry Division who had participated in these operations. They did not, however, apparently interview any of the medical personnel. They did collect a number of reports that medical personnel had already submitted to the 112th Regimental Surgeon and division surgeon. These documents are part of the larger collection of 28th Infantry Division interviews and draft historical reports that were compiled by the 2d Information and Historical Service for use of the ETO historian’s office. These documents were later used in writing the official history of the U.S. Army in World War II, specifically in Charles B. MacDonald’s, The Siegfried Line Campaign, and his chapter on Schmidt in Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt. Now entitled Combat Interviews 75 and 76, 28th Infantry Division in the Hürtgen Forest today these documents reside in the Record Group 407, Box 24032, National Archives and Records Administration, at College Park,MD.
Included are the reports of:
Maj. Albert L. Berndt, Medical Corps, Surgeon, 112th Infantry Regiment, “Report on Medical Evacuation,” 10 November 1944.
Capt. Paschal Linguiti, Medical Corps, Surgeon, 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, “Mis-use of Aid Station Site,” 16 November 1944.
Capt. Paschal Linguiti, Medical Corps, Surgeon, 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, and Capt. Michael DeMarco, Medical Corps, Surgeon, 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, “Evacuation of Wounded from Vossenack Kommerscheidt and Schmidt Areas, 2-11 November 1944.” 15 November 1944.
2d Lt. Alfred W. Muglia, Medical Administrative Corps, Assistant Battalion Surgeon, 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, “Report on Medical Evacuation,” 11 November 1944.
2d Lt. Henry W. Morrison, Medical Administrative Corps, Medical Detachment, 112th Infantry Regiment, “Report of Medical Evacuation,” 11 November 1944.
1st Lt. Loyd C. Johnson, Medical Administrative Corps, Company C, 103d Medical Battalion, 28th Infantry Division, “Casualty Evacuation Report,” n.d.
Capt John S. Howe, Infantry, 2d Information and Historical Services, “Vossenack-Kommerscheidt-Schmidt,” n.d.
John T. Greenwood, Ph.D.
Chief, Office of Medical History
Office of The Surgeon General, U.S. Army
Maj. Albert L. Berndt, Medical Corps, Surgeon, 112th Infantry Regiment, “Report on Medical Evacuation,” 10 November 1944.
Headquarters, 112th Infantry Regiment, APO 28, U.S. Army, 10 November 1944
HEADQUARTERS, 112TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
APO 28, U.S. ARMY
10 November 1944
SUBJECT: Report on Medical Evacuation
TO: Division Surgeon, 28th Infantry Division, APO 28, U.S. Army
1. The information concerning medical evacuation in the 112th Regimental Combat Team during the attacks on and the defense of the German villages of Vossenack, Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt], and Schmidt is provided below in chronological order.
2. In reading the following report, several pertinent facts should be borne in mind. First that the majority of the material given here was based on reports and information received at the Regimental Headquarters Medical Detachment from a wide variety of sources and that, since no station log was kept of those reports, they are being repeated from memory of the writer and of those people to whom access is available at present. Third, that accurate information of both past and impending operations was difficult for the writer to obtain subsequent to the removal of Regimental Advanced Headquarters from the pillbox at 015331 to the village of Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt]. Third, that communications between the 1st-3rd Battalion aid stations, the Collecting Company and Regimental Headquarters aid station were completely lacking after 0300 hours 6 November 1944, except for occasional messages carried by Medical Department personnel. Fourth, and most important, that the difficulty of the terrain over which military operations took place made the evacuation of the wounded possible only under conditions of the utmost physical hardship. Fifth, that the efforts of two reinforced Regimental Combat Teams and at least two task forces flatly failed to secure the Main Supply Route over which evacuation had to be made. No further allusion to these facts will be made herein,
3. All maps coordinates below refer to Sheet 5304, Nideggen, Germany, scale 1/25,000.
4. The chronological report follows:
2 November 1944: 0900 hours - 112th White Battalion attacked Vossenack, reaching objective at 1345. 112th had crossed LOD at 1300. Evacuation was excellent.
3 November 1944: 1450 hours - 112th Blue Battalion reported Schmidt captured. 112th Battalion followed in support of Blue, occupied Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt]. Positions of Battalion Aid Station at 1800 hours: Red in valley at 014307, White in Barracks at 022329 where it remained until 8 November, Blue rear at 018333 and forward in church at 038326. At this time the lines of evacuation were stretched, but evacuation was quite successful and the Aid Stations counted on moving forward at dawn the following morning.
4 November 1944: 0905 hours - 112th Blue Bn. reported driven out of Schmidt, withdrew to Red positions in Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt].
1400 hours - Regimental commander requested investigation of medical evacuation from Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt]. Assistant Regimental Surgeon visited Red Aid Station at 054308 to determine the tactical situation, the methods of evacuation and needs of the Aid Station, found casualties heavy, the Aid Station under direct fire of enemy artillery, but evacuation continuing successfully.
1700 hours - Message received from Blue Surgeon requesting additional
SOURCE: National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 407, Records of The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Combat Interviews (CI-76), 28th Infantry Division, Hürtgen Forest Campaign, Box 24032.
2
Medical Personnel immediately. Four Technicians, Carr, Marinclin, Lopes and Moss, were sent from the Regimental Aid Station to give help. Upon their arrival they found, they were not needed, and upon the suggestion of the Blue Surgeon, continued forward to the Red Aid Station where they might be needed. Carr and Marinclin remained at the Red Aid Station overnight, returning the following afternoon to Regimental Aid Station. Lopes and Moss departed the Red Aid Station with seven casualties in a weasel. They brought a request from the Red Aid Station for food and Medical supplies, arriving at Regimental Aid Station at 0100 Hrs next day.
1800 hrs. - Location of Aid Stations: White unchanged. Red in house on edge at Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] at 054308, Blue at dug in log cabin at 046316. Ambulance loading point at 045317 at edge at woods on forward slope of hill. Casualties are being moved by weasels from e Red and Blue Aid Stations to Ambulance Loading Point.
5 November 1944: 0830 hrs. - Rations, Medical supplied and water were sent by weasel from Regimental Aid Station to Red Aid Station in house in Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt]. This was the first food received by the Red Aid Station in two days. Evacuation continued successfully.
Afternoon - Red Aid Station house received three direct hits by enemy artillery high explosive shells, killing one Medical private, destroying the supplies which had been received. Feeling that the house was no longer tenable, the Red surgeon waited until dark, then withdrew the Aid Station from Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] and joined the Blue Aid Station in the log cabin at 046316. Both Aid Station groups continued to occupy this location, operating a joint Red-Blue Aid Station until the evening of 9 November.
Evening - Casualties were carried from front to Red-Blue Aid Station by weasel, from Aid Station to Ambulance Loading Point by litter carry because of blockage of road by stalled tank.
6 November l944: 0200 hrs. - Lieut. Johnson departed from Red-Blue Aid Station leaving Aid Station free of casualties.
0300 hrs. - All communications between Advance and Rear Regimental Headquarters were cut off by enemy penetrations from northeast and southwest along valley to bridge at 047313. No further reliable information received from Advance Headquarters.
0800 hrs. - T/5 Benninger, from Red-Blue Aid Station, arrived at Regimental Aid Station saying that he had been out off from the Red-Blue Aid Station by a German patrol about 2200 hours last night, had taken shelter in an abandoned tank, had finally managed to escape fran the pursuing patrol by following the defile of the woods from the area of the bridge to RJ 446 at 019324. Benninger, one of our most reliable men, reported that the Aid Station was cut off by the enemy both from the Red and Blue Battalions in front and from White Battalion to the rear. He also reported that the route by which he had escaped was impossible for litter teams to cross with casualties.
Day - During this day, and subsequent days, the Red-Blue Aid Station was in German-held territory. Several times each day German Medics and infantrymen visited the Aid station. They permitted walking wounded to cross through their position while returning to the Aid Station from Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt], they made no attempt to interfere with the operation of the Aid Station. They offered to supply the Aid Station personnel with dressings and sulfanilamide, they stated that the Aid Station personnel and wounded would not be molested as long as no American infantrymen tried to bring their weapons into the area. The truth of these statements can not be denied; they have been confirmed by all the Medical
3
Officers and men in the Aid Station. However, the Germans did capture all the vehicles belonging to the combined Air Station. Subsequent evacuation from the Aid Station could be made only by litter carry uphill the Aid Station to whatever point could be reached by ambulances or other evacuation vehicles.
0804 hrs.- White battalion was forced to withdraw to the center of Vossenack. Although the situation was temporarily restored by a counterattack by Engineers, the status of the control of the eastern half of the village was continually doubtful according to all information reaching the Regimental Aid Station. As a result, the main road from Vossenack to Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] was denied to Medical Vehicles from Vossenack to the ambulance loading point. This necessitated forward moving vehicles to leave the main street of Vossenack at 033326 turn south to the border of the woods, then follow the defilade of the woods in a most circuitous route to the Ambulance Loading Point. Further difficulties were added by sharp sideways slope of the path which at places almost caused the weasels and ambulances to fall over on their sides, and by a German battery in the vicinity of 065334 which fired on every vehicle seen to be moving in the field south of Vossenack. Visibility from this battery, or from its observers, apparently permitted the vehicles to be seen but was not sufficient for the Red Crosses to be seen. Hence the battery fired on Medical vehicles as on others. During this day the further evacuation of wounded from the combined Aid Stations was impossible.
7 November 1944: 0100 hrs. - A Regimental Supply Train of weasels departed for Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt], successfully passed through the German-held territory in the valley by the Red-Blue Aid Station, returned with twenty-two casualties from the Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] area. These the last casualties to be evacuated from Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] area other than several walking wounded who made their own way through the enemy lines. This last train stopped at the combined Aid Station and an officer knocked on the door. Either the occupants were asleep, or more likely feared a German ruse, and did not answer the knock. Since the waiting Train was under fire, the knocking was not repeated and the Train continued without having picked up any casualties from the Aid Station. The twenty-two casualties were delivered to the Regimental Aid Station at 0730 hours.
0500 hrs. - Rain rendered the defilade route previously used by evacuating weasels too slippery for further use.
0800 hrs. - Second Lieut. Morrison from Red Aid Station, together with three or four walking wounded arrived at Regimental Aid Station, having followed the valley used by Benninger previously. He requested that wounded be evacuated from Aid Station, but said that the route he had followed could not be used by litter bearers because of the length of the haul and the steepness of the terrain. At noon 2nd Lieut. Morrison returned to the Red-Blue Aid Station afoot using the same route.
1500 hrs. - First Lieut. Page, of Collecting Company, left White Aid Station with three litter squads to evacuate wounded from Red-Blue Aid Station to Ambulance Loading Point. Arrived at Aid Station, evacuated seven walking wounded and three litter cases, during which two litter bearers were shot by the enemy. Lt. Page and the litter bearers remained at the Aid Station overnight.
1530 hrs. - Lt. Johnson departed White Aid Station with weasel, followed slippery mud track at edge of woods, arrived at 045316 where the wounded brought by Page were loaded on the weasel and a1/4 ton trailer found nearby. He returned, leaving only seven casualties in the Aid Station, by the route along the woods, almost overturning on the slope at 041318, arriving at White Aid Station at 1800 hours.
1900 hrs. - In view of the impossibility of the evacuation of wounded from Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] hill, I suggested to S-2 and S-4 of Regiment that a truce be arranged with the enemy for a period of several hours in order to
4
sweep the Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] area and evacuate our dead and wounded. The suggestion was declined. Instead, a second attempt to run a Supply Train through under cover of darkness was ordered. I suggested that supplies be dropped to Red and Blue Battalions and to the Aid Station by air. This, too, was declined.
8 November 1944: 0100 hrs. The Regimental Supply Train, including two Medical Technicians from Regimental Headquarters Aid Station, attempted to penetrate the enemy lines, was fired upon somewhere south of Vossenack and was ordered to return by the commanding officer. Regimental S-4 spent most of night exploring, unsuccessfully, for an alternate route of approach to Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt]. No supplies got through, no casualties were evacuated either from Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] or from the Aid Station.
Morning - Lt. Johnson reported five attempts by himself to get a weasel down to the ambulance loading point. Fired upon each time by the enemy battery at 065334, he was forced ti withdraw and abandon the attempt.
1300 hrs. - I recommended to the Division Surgeon that a truce be arranged to permit removal of casualties from inaccessible Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] and the Aid Station area. Together we went to make the suggestion to Brigadier General Davis at the Regimental Rear CP. General Davis was not there. The Division Surgeon departed for Division Headquarters with the statement that he would make the suggestion to Commanding General.
1500 hrs. - All other methods of evacuation having failed, Lieut. Johnson reported that he was taking five ambulances and eight litter teams to establish a new Ambulance Loading Point at 029313 from which he proposed to travel to 033314, 037316, and across the nose of the hill to the Red-Blue Aid Station. This route, a last resort, would have required an airline litter carry of one mile with extremely difficult descent and ascent of two high hills.
1700 hrs. - Lieut. Johnson reported that attempt had failed. Having reached 037316 he was informed that “L” Company had been forced back to that point and that further progress down the valley would lead into enemy lines. Johnson continued despite this warning, encountered heavy mortar fire at 039318, was forced to withdraw.
1800 hrs. - All remaining troops of Red and Blue Battalions withdrew from Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] Hill by breaking up into small groups and making individual escapes through enemy lines.
Red-Blue Aid Station remained at same location.
2000 hrs. - Lieuts. Johnson and Page returned to Collecting Company for the night.
2300 hrs. - Division Surgeon called via telephone, said that Division G-4 had ordered 13 weasels with armed guard to proceed immediately to Red-Blue Aid Station to evacuate fifty casualties known to be there. Regimental S-4 was contacted, agreed with me that arming of convoy as dangerous. S-4 wanted Lieut. Johnson to accompany the convoy and had sent a message to him. I sent another by courier, in case the S-4 message were lost. I arranged for ambulances to meet the returning convoy at the White Aid Station, now taken over by 109th White. Lieut. Johnson received message too late to catch convoy.
9 November 1944: 0245 hrs. - Weasel convoy reached original Ambulance Loading Point vicinity but overshot road in darkness, could not find Air Station. At 045321 the convoy was fired upon and Pfc. Shumacher, of the Medical Detachment, who had volunteered to accompany the convoy as a guide, was killed. One weasel was disabled. The remaining vehicles withdrew, having failed to reach the Aid Station or to evacuate any wounded.
5
0800 hrs. - I phoned Division G-4, volunteered to go under a flag of truce to the German lines to arrange a truce to enable us to evacuate wounded from Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] Hill, now free of American combat troops. I requested authority be given me by Division Commanding General to make definite arrangements with the enemy for the truce. My request was denied. G-4 suggested that I merely determine the attitude of the enemy toward a truce, leaving the details and official confirmation to be made later.
0950 hrs. - With T/4 Wheeler W. Wolters acting as flagbearer and interpreter, I departed from Vossenack on foot across brow of hill toward Aid Station. Arrived at Aid Station without being fired upon, found Aid Station personnel loading forty-four casualties into two 2 ½ ton trucks and one weasel which had been abandoned along road at Aid Station area by Services Company. Ten litter cases remained in the Aid Station. All Medical personnel there, including two MO, two MAC, two Chaplains and six enlisted men, together with thirty infantrymen, tankers and engineers enlisted men who were acting as emergency litter bearers, were in good shape.
Wolters and I continued past the Aid Station down the hill to the bridge at 046313 which we found blown out. After a short delay a German Lieutenant with five men came out to join us on the road. They were most courteous, made no attempt to search or harm us. I stated my intentions. The German Lieutenant said that all American wounded had been evacuated from the Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] Hill by the German Army Medical Department and that the German Medical Officer and enlisted men had completed the evacuation and had withdrawn only twenty minutes before my arrival.
Since there appeared to be no further need of arranging a truce for evacuation from Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt], I stated that we were going to remove three truckloads of wounded from our Aid Station and that two of the trucks would return for the remaining wounded and medical personnel. The German Lieutenant offered to evacuate our wounded, but I declined in order to give him no opportunity or excuse to capture our Medical Department personnel. He agreed to permit the vehicles to pass out without interference by his men, but added that he had no communications with his superior officer to inform him of my request. He said that he expected a telephone line to be completed shortly and that he would inform both his superior officer and the German artillery to permit the vehicles to get out unmolested. He said and repeated that the German Army scrupulously observed the Red Cross and would not fire upon anyone or any vehicle which clearly displayed the Red Cross. Following an exchange of salutes, I returned to the Red-Blue Aid Station.
There I found that the loaded trucks had tried to get up the hill toward Vossenack but were completely blocked by two medium tanks. I returned to Holland White Aid Station, reported to Division G-4, outlined the situation to Lieutenant Johnson who took numerous litter bearers and ambulances to the ambulance landing point at the stalled tanks and evacuated all the wounded, all medical personnel, some of the assistant litter bearers, the MAC officers and all members of his own party. German soldiers who helped with the ambulance loading restrained the Medical Officers and Chaplains from leaving. Lack of further information from these officers indicates that they were captured and held.
SUMMARY 5. Evacuation of casualties during the Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt]-Schmidt operation was impeded by the most difficult type of terrain, by a wretched road network which was worsened by daily rain, by a shortage of vehicles at the beginning, and by the early loss by capture of the Red and Blue Battalions’ Medical vehicles, by
6
frequent blockage of the single road by knocked-out tanks, by lack of communications, and by being in the position of operating a two-battalion [Aid Station] for three days behind the German lines. Despite these handicaps, evacuation was continued intermittently until the American infantry failed to regain the valley in which the Aid Station was located. Then it stopped. Negotiations carried out under a flag of truce enabled every casualty at the Aid Station and most medical personnel to be removed safely.
6. To the credit of the Medical Department, let it be well noted that the Red-Blue Aid Station personnel remained in their Air Station behind the German lines, taking can of their wounded and making every humanly possible effort to evacuate the wounded themselves, for a period of more than twenty hours after every other member of the 112th Regimental Combat Team had withdrawn to positions in the rear of the original Line of Departure of the Vossenack attack.
7. Let it also be made a matter of record that only one method of total evacuation proved feasible: under the flag of truce; that this method was suggested to the Regimental Staff and later to the Division General Staff in plenty of time to permit the evacuation of all American wounded from the Schmidt-Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] area; that these suggestions were declined until it was too late to reach this area and these wounded were left by the withdrawing Infantry to be picked up by the enemy; and that, had the suggestion of a truce been adopted when first made, evacuation would have been completed with no detriment to the eventual tactical outcome of the operation.
ALBERT L. BERNDT,
Major, Medical Corps,
Regimental Surgeon.
Capt. Paschal Linguiti, Medical Corps, Surgeon, 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, “Mis-use of Aid Station Site,” 16 November 1944.
Medical Detachment, 112th Infantry Regiment, APO 28, U.S. Army, 16 November 1944
MEDICAL DETACHMENT, 112TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
APO 28, U. S. ARMY
16 November 1944
SUBJECT: Mis-use of Aid Station Site.
TO: Regimental Surgeon, 112th Inf. Rgt.
1. Late on the afternoon of 3 November 1944 Red Bn. moved into Vossenack. An aid station site was established but within an hour the order was received to be ready to move immediately. No indiction was given to the destination or anticipated route.
2 The site was immediately abandoned amd the remainder of the Bn. Med. Section took up the march in to rear at the rapidly moving column. The weasel carrying the aid station equipment followed the rear of the column. The trip was cross country thru markedly hilly and wooded areas. We reached a steep rocky hill down which it was impossible to take the vehicle. It was therefore left under guard at the top of the hill and the pack equipment was carried by the men.
3. Our destination turned out to be the town of Kommerscheidt, which we reach about 2200, 3 November 1944.
4. The Bn. CP was located in a dugout in a sparsely stocked small orchard. We were told by the Bn CO to remain there, dig in and wait for the morning. In view of the impracticability of digging in an aid station in this small open orchard, Lt. Morrison and I set out to find a more suitable area. The only available site, a house with cellar that could be adapted for blackout use.
5. Early on the morning of the 4 November 1944 it was noticed that an 81 mm mortar was being implaced just about 10 yards to the left of the aid station. About the same distance to the right and forward of it just a few yards was a machine gun emplacement. In a short while there were two medium tanks not more than 25 yards to the left rear of the aid station.
6. On the afternoon of 4 November 1944, the Blue artillery observer took his post in a concrete shelter about 5 feet the left of the aid station entrance.
7. At approximately 0500, 5 November 1944, the supply train dumped its ammo and ration load in front of the entrance. For the next 2 to 3 hours the area was the site of distribution for the ammo and rations to representatives of the elements of two battalions, of which there were at least three from each company.
8. Throughout the previous 24 hours the aid station became the central meeting point for all elements present, neceesitating frequent admonitions and demands that they find some other place.
SOURCE: National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 407, Records of The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Combat Interviews (CI-76), 28th Infantry Division, Hürtgen Forest Campaign, Box 24032.
2
9. In the course of the afternoon of 5 November 1944 , between 1200-1600 the aid station itself was the site of three direct hits further injuring several already wounded patients and killing three medical personnel. There were other near direct hits which destroyed medical personnel. There were other near direct hits which destroyed the artillery observers post and the immediately adjacent outhouse. The aid station site became useless and during a lull we started to move our patients and equipment to the Horseshoe blue aid station. During the procedure we were hampered by shells which fell at uncomfortable [?] from the site.
10. Observations and suggesions:
a. It has been the practice in the past to take off on a mission without sufficient, if any, information regarding the need for medical support. It has been the opinion, expressed or implied, that medical support is “nice” to have along, but rarely is adequate provision attempted beforehand that would help insure speedy and safe treatment and evacuation of the wounded.
b. Information regarding contact with the enemy is not relayed to the medical personnel so that they may be led to expect casualties. Instead the first indication is the rapid influx of patients which necessitates establishing an aid station in the most unusual and dangerous situated sites.
c. Other military installations have absolute disregard for the proximity of an already established aid station site thus jeopardizing the lives and safety of men who are unable to protect themselves. Tanks, mortars and machine guns in action present a definite hazard to adjacent areas.
d. The aid. station should not be interpreted as being a shelter or meeting place for other than wounded who need medical care.
[signed]
PASCHAL A. LINGUITI , CAPT, MC
Surgeon, 1st Bn., 112th Inf. Regt.
Capt. Paschal Linguiti, Medical Corps, Surgeon, 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, and Capt. Michael DeMarco, Medical Corps, Surgeon, 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, “Evacuation of Wounded from Vossenack Kommerscheidt and Schmidt Areas, 2-11 November 1944.” 15 November 1944.
Medical Detachment, 112th Infantry Regiment, APO 28, U.S. Army, 15 November 1944
MEDICAL DETACHMENT, 112TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
APO 28, U.S. ARMY
15 November 1944
SUBJECT: Evacuation of Wounded from Vossenack Kommerscheidt and Schmidt Areas, 2-11 November 1944
TO: Regimental Surgeon, 112th Infantry Regiment, APO 28, U.S. Army
1. Evacuation of the wounded was fairly well accomplished until the 1st and 3rd Bns were committed to occupy and block off the town of Schmidt . At incipiency of this operations (sic), 1st Bn Aid Stations was located in woods west of Vossenack. An early move took 1st Bn Aid Station to Kommerscheidt where it was set up in a building. The 3rd Bn aid station was established in church at cross roads of Vossenack. This was on the night of 3rd November. On the 4th of November, the 3rd. Bn Aid Station moved into a log bunker on a wooded mountain alongside of the MSR trail from Vossenack to Kommerscheidt (046316). Evacuation of the wounded at this time was accomplished though with some difficulty. All of the wounded from units committed at the front were collected at the aforementioned bunker. From there they were transported by Weasel to Vossenack where they were picked up by ambulances. On the next day this advance ambulance collecting point was changed to a site close to the 2nd Bn 112th Aid Station at the old German Camp (Germeter).
2. On the 5th of November 1944 the 1st Bn Aid Station was directly and repeatedly struck by artillery fire which killed some medical personnel and rendered the site useless as an aid station. It was decided to move this 1st Bn aid station to join the 3rd Bn aid station at the aforementioned bunker. A combined forward aid station collecting point consisting of 8 litter bearers from the 1st Bn and 1 jeep and drivers from the third Bn was left at the building in Kommerscheidt. During one of the jeep trips from Kommerscheidt that night, our medical personnel was attacked by Germans and two of our men wounded. Later the Germans apologized for this saying that they had not noticed the displayed red Cross armbands. Later that night the MSR was shelled then attacked by German soldiers. It was controlled, mined and apparently blocked. They made no attempt to molest the aid station not [nor] did they inquire as to the occupants of the bunker. Soon after this attack another medical jeep returning from the advanced collecting point at Kommerscheidt was stopped by the Germans who told the driver to abandon the jeep since the road from there on was mined. They allowed our man to return to us.
3. Later in the morning (6 November) an attempt to continue evacuation as previously was made. However the route of evacuation was controlled by the enemy. 4 of our medical personnel were captured and the rest were allowed to return to the aid station with the wounded. From then on our evacuation system broke down. Walking wounded were organized into parties and guided out through the woods by our medical personnel. No contact with us was made by the 103rd Med. Coll. Co. C., throughout this interval. Also we have no idea whatsoever of the military situation around us. A number of unsuccessful attempts to evacuate the litter patients were made and each time we had to take the wounded back. That afternoon another American engineer unit infiltrated to the MSR before us; and that night the Germans repeated their attack and again gained complete control of the supply route. This time they inquired at the aid station, told us that we were prisoners of war. Asked whether we had enough rations and promised that the next day the German medics would bring rations and take over.
SOURCE: National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 407, Records of The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Combat Interviews (CI-76), 28th Infantry Division, Hürtgen Forest Campaign, Box 24032.
2
4. On 8th November the situation became more acute since our wounded were accumulating. Lt. Morrison and Sgt. Shedio decided to lead out one of the walking wounded parties and to contact the 103rd Medics or organize any other possible method of evacuation. They returned about three hours later with the promise of four weasels. Later on we were told that they had arrived in the woods behind the ridge line. Upon taking up our wounded we discovered only one weasel and a trailer. This was inadequate and obviously only a token attempt at evacuation. The vehicle took off hurriedly and did not return. We disappointedly had to carry wounded back to our aid station. That night was a real nightmare. Wounded came to us in great numbers. We had no facilities for them. We accumulated about 65 litter patients. About 25 of which were crowded into the bunker and the rest had to be left along the roadside. German medics guided and in some cases carried our wounded to us. Even German riflemen threw aside their rifles to give us a hand. We have only an indicatory knowledge of the number of walking wounded since we were unable to treat them and just urged them to keep on walking and follow organized walking wounded parties. And sometime during this confusing night, Gen. Davis visited us. The situation was explained to him. He made no comments. The night was miserable. It snowed and rained. We had no blankets and few litters though medical supplies and rations were adequate. The remaining had to work harder. Artillery shells, from both sides, fell all over the place but none hit any of our party. I am certain that the Germans took special precautions to avoid hitting us. It is felt that practically all movable wounded had been carried to our aid station; others had been collected in shelter by our aid men and our aid men remained with them to be captured and evacuated by the Germans. We know of at least two such groups.
5. The next morning, 9 November, and still no news from the rear. Two 2 ½ ton trucks in good condition were found and it was decided to risk evacuation by their use. Just as this hospital train was about to take off, Major Berndt, Regimental Surgeon of the 112th Infantry came to us under a flag of truce so as to effect evacuation of our wounded. He left to return later with the information that this truce had been accomplished through his discussion with a German Infantry officer. Meanwhile the trucks had already taken off. However it later developed that the road was blocked by knocked out tanks and that the trucks were unable to proceed. These trucks, laden with wounded were left on the top of the mountain and it was decided by Lt. Morrison and Sgt. Shedio to go ahead by weasel and get ambulances at all cost. Major Berndt found out of this failure when he came across the blocked trucks on his way back to the rear. No Germans were around at the time. About 1 hour later one of our medics came to the bunker with the story that the vehicles were surrounded by German soldiers and they wanted to see the doctor in charge. Capt. DeMarco went to see them. Evidently this was a new group and knew of no previous contacts nor transaction. After much talk they agreed to allow evacuation of only our seriously wounded and of all our medical personnel. Slightly wounded and non-medical personnel would be "Kaput". About 4 hours later after much anxiety and prayer, the ambulances 8 did show up. All the wounded were loaded. The Germans checked as to the seriousness of the wounded and validity of Red Cross cards of the medics. No one was molested or harmed. The German officer in charge commanded to retain all the officers, i.e., Chaplains Madden and Mainess, and Doctors DeMarco and Linguiti. After some talking by Father Madden the officer in charge agreed to have an ambulance call for us the next day between twelve and one and that they would let us go at the time. This information was given to a German speaking MAC Lt. of the 103rd Medics (Co. A.). We returned to our bunker with the understanding we were to go back to the [?] the next day at twelve o'clock. Once back to our aid station we again started to get wounded. At this time we discovered that the 3rd Bn 109th Infantry had infiltrated behind us.
3
We accumulated about 12 to 15 wounded and the problem of evacuating them again presented itself.
6. Next day, 10 November, we returned to the top of the hill to the Germans. They insisted that they would not let us go unless all the Americans in the area would surrender and that we would return to them all the slightly wounded Germans that we had evacuated. These conditions were impossible. During the meeting we were shelled and the Germans took to their foxholes. We started after them but it is suppose, that in order not to show us their installation, they ordered us to return to our bunker. Once there we continued operating our station. Our primary purpose was to evacuate the accumulated wounded. The unit behind us was requested to get their aid station to get some means of evacuation started. We already had been advised that it was too dangerous to attempt a litter haul or walking wounded trek through the woods.
7. 11 November, litter bearers got though to us in some way. We were told that a weasel could come part of the way. We evacuated the wounded we had by this route and we escaped with the walking wounded following a roundabout trail through the woods and behind the ridge line. This however was accomplished only after another truce was made with the German medical officer on the bottom of the hill. The request was first made by the enemy for them to pick up their dead; and we were to evacuate our wounded at the same time. This proved to be only a truce amongst medics since for some reason our artillery refused to recognize a lull and opened fire. This was countered by the enemy shelling of Vossenack. But we had already started our evacuation and we decided to [go] through with it at all risks. Incidentally, the German medical officer at the bottom of the hill had no contact with the German soldiers on the top of the hill (whose prisoners we had been.)
8. Impression, observation and recommendations.
A. German personnel respected the Geneva Convention and cooperated with our medical personel.
B. American medical personnel is in dire need of larger and more visible Red Cross markings.
C. The Germans repeatedly told us that our markings were inadequate and any shooting up of our boys was due to the invisibility of the armband. We had practical observation of this shortcoming. Our litter teams should carry a Red Cross Flag.
D. No evacuation of wounded should be attempted at night across enemy lines or patrols. The Germans said they shoot at everything at night, but would let the Red Cross go during the day. Our men who were shot by Germans were hit during the night.
E. German medical personnel should be granted the privileges outlined by the Geneva Convention. They carry pistols it is true but evidently they are not used except for personal protection and psychological security. (Col. Seetz placed several ??? after this statement.)[Lt. Col. Seetz was the Division Surgeon, 28th Infantry Division-ed.]
F. The problem of medical evacuation is synonymous with the maintenance of a supply route. The failure of one makes the other almost impossible.
G. Tactical units should make some attempt to inform the aid station of the military situation. For example we had no knowledge as to whether our troops had withdrawn from Schmidt, Kommerscheidt or Vossenack, and had to take chances on the route suggested to the walking wounded parties.
H. The Coll. Co. should accept their responsibility of evacuating the aid station and not leave the entire problem to the forward installation. If it could not get through, it should at least let us know of its failure and not just abandon the aid station.
4
I. Battalion commanders should be reminded that the Ft. Benning school solutions in the handling of the Bn Aid Station is impractical and its maintenance and establishment should closely follow the advice of the Battalion Surgeon.
J. The present practice of having Chaplains with the aid stations is a helpful one. The medical Administrative Officers more than proved their worth. They were a strong peg in the maintenance of a sound and robust system of treatment and evacuation.
s/Paschal Linguiti s/Michael DeMarco
PASCHAL LINGUITI MICHAEL DEMARCO
Surgeon, 1st Bn., 112th Inf Surg., 3rd Bn., 112th Inf.
2d Lt. Alfred W. Muglia, Medical Administrative Corps, Assistant Battalion Surgeon, 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, “Report on Medical Evacuation,” 11 November 1944.
Medical Detachment, 112th Infantry Regiment, APO 28, U.S. Army, 11 November 1944
MEDICAL DETACHMENT, 112TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
APO 28 ,U. S. ARMY
11 November 1944
SUBJECT: Report on Medical Evacuation.
TO : Division Surgeon, 28th Div., APO 28, U. S Army.
1. The following is a Medical Report of the 3rd (Blue) Bn., 112th Inf. from 3 November 1944 to 1730, 9 November 1944. This is an eye-witness report of the undersigned, Alfred J. Muglia, xxxxxxxx, 2nd. Lt. MAC, 3rd Bn. Surgeons Asst. Map coordinates used below refer to Sheet 5304, Nideggen, Germany, scale l/25000.
2. On the morning of 3 Nov. 1944 the Blue Aid Station was located at 018334. We were informed that Co’s K & L had passed Vossenack. With S/Sgt. Lester Repine, Cpl. Victor Machinski, two litter squads, and attached weasel driver, I established a forward aid station at the church in Vossenack (038326 ). Despite heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire, evacuation was excellent. Two jeeps and a weasel were used to shuttle patients from our forward aid station to the rear aid station where our ambulance loading point and been established.
3. On the afternoon of 3 November 1944 with Pfc John Jones attached weasel driver from 229th FA and Blue Trans. Officer, I entered the woods on the MSR at 045317. We drove out 200 yds on the MSR. Because of the narrowness of the road, the weasel jumped its tracks. Several patients had already accumulated. I gave first aid to two. Pfc. Jones and I placed them in a defiladed position. Enemy artillery here was heavy. I returned on foot with the Trans. officer to our forward aid station, got a litter squad and a jeep and returned for the patients. I told the litter squad to dig in at the edge of the woods. All the known patients were evacuated that night. After nightfall about 20 casualties occurred around Vossenack. They were evacuated by midnight. I returned to our rear aid station.
4. At 0500, 4 November 1944 Tec 3 John N. Shedio on duty at Blue aid station (rear) entered the dugout in which the Blue Surgeon, Capt. Michael DeMarco, MC was asleep. He said that he had received a phone call from Blue Trans. officer stating that the Blue CO wanted the Medics to move to the town of Schmidt. After evacuating all casualties we moved all our aid station equipment and personnel to the church at Vossenack. The Blue Surgeon with a minimum of personnel remained at the church. Tec 3 Shedio and I took the remainder of personnel and equipment to the point at the edge of the woods where we had left one litter squad. We immediately dispatched all litter squads to comb the area for casualties. Tec 3 Shedio and I made a reconnaissance of the area to find a location for our new aid station site. We decided on 046316. Here was a log cabin dug?out approximately 12' x 18' x 8'. The entire cabin was dug in with the exception of the front which was partially barricaded by rocks. The roof was constructed of two layers of logs about 12 inches in diameter. It afforded good protection from everything save a direct hit. I contacted Capt. DeMarco who was evacuating new casualties caused by continuing enemy artillery fire on Vossenack. All communications were out. We used runners. When Capt. DeMarco arrived, some engineers were still in our cabin dugout using it for shelter. We immediately informed them that [we] were using it for an aid station, asked them to leave with all arms. We hung a red cross panel in the most conspicuous place. Immediately more patients began accruing from enemy artillery. Tanks were
SOURCE: National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 407, Records of The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Combat Interviews (CI-76), 28th Infantry Division, Hürtgen Forest Campaign, Box 24032.
2
beginning to use our MSR. It was wet and narrow and their progress was slow. We established our new ambulance loading post at the edge of the woods (054308) [coordinates are incorrect, probably 045318-ed.]. Tanks were stuck along the route and blocked the narrow and slippery MSR the only available route.
5. About 0900, 5 November 1944, we were informed that the road was partially clear. I loaded two litter squads on a jeep driven by Tec 3 Carr and started to help the Red aid station. The road was winding, muddy and narrow the entire route. At the edge of the woods about 900 yds. from the Red aid station the road was again blocked by tanks. I told my litter squads to dismount and follow us with two litters from the edge of the woods to the Red aid station was an open field about 800 yards. I told my litter bearers to keep a 5 yard interval and keep following me. When we were about 300 yds. from the Red aid station an enemy artillery shell hit the center of our squad killing Pfc Switzer and injuring all others. The injured again made a dash for the Red aid station. Here I found two American tanks and mortars on each side of the aid station firing at the enemy. A few minutes later two Blue medical jeeps arrived, also the Blue Chaplains jeep driven by his assistant Tec 5 Owensby, and a Red medical weasel. That afternoon, under heavy enemy artillery fire, the three jeeps and the weasel shuttled patients from the Red Aid station to the Blue. Artillery shells continued to fall near the wounded in the aid station. I witnessed two direct hits which further injured some of the [wounded?] and killed one Red Medic. Capt. Wickens, MC was seriously injured there. Capt Linguiti, MC, Red surgeon, 2nd Lt. Morrison, MAC, Chaplain Madden, Red Chaplain and the undersigned were the officers present at the Red aid station. I returned to the Blue aid station about 1830 with a jeep load of patients. The remaining officers arrived about an hour later. When I left all the known patients were evacuated from the Red aid station to the Blue. Now the Blue aid station became the Blue-Red aid station. The old Red aid station was designated as a forward collecting point at Kommerscheidt. Pfc. Putney came running into the aid station stating the Germans had stopped him with a load of walking wounded. He could not understand them. They made him carry a German wounded at the point of a gun (all German medics we saw carry pistols) (Luger and P 38) and then released him.
6. About 0200, 6 November 1944 a knock was heard at the door of the now combined Blue-Red aid station. The knocker identified himself as German private. Pfc. Joseph Cally, Blue medical clerk spoke German with the German private. Result of conversation according to Pvt Cally was that we were German prisoners. The German Pvt. called another enemy soldier who identified himself as a Tech Sgt. in charge of the group. He asked if we had any arms. Pvt. Cally answered that we had no arms that we were American medical men taking care of wounded. He then asked if we had rations. Pvt Cally replied that we enough for one day. The German noncom then said he would bring us rations and some German medics. He further ordered us to remain there. A German guard was left at our door. We found an American .45 pistol on one of our patients and gave it to the enemy guard. At daybreak the German guard had left. Enemy soldiers could be seen from our aid station patrolling the woods that faced our dugout cabin. On a hill to the rear of our aid station were a company of engineers (1340th Eng.). They fought with the Germans the previous night. Many of our patients came from this company. Evacuations for the day was [were] blocked.
7. On November 7th, we treated casualties from 109th, 110th and 112th Regts., Co. A and C of l340th Engrs, 893TD Bn. and 707 Tank Bn. The patients stated that they were told that our aid station was the only means of receiving medical care in the vicinity. They also stated that they heard rumors that we had many ambulances to take them to the rear. That day
3
several groups of walking wounded were led to the rear guided by our enlisted medics who carried large Red Crosses. During that day 3 Germans surrendered to us at the aid station. I disarmed them, called a rifleman from the hill behind us. The rifleman took the prisoners away. We told the rifleman that our evacuation was being blocked by Germans and to tell the CO to try to clear the hill of the enemy. We further warned them to keep away from the aid station. That night Lt. Johnson arrived at the Aid station. He told Lt. Morrison he had 2 weasels. Our boys carried enough patients to load 2 weasels. Upon their return I learned only one weasel load and a trailer got back with patients and one litter patient had to come back. The road was still blocked by three knocked out tanks and enemy mines. It was almost dusk. End of evacuation for the day. Sgt. Repine, our section Sgt., and two Red enlisted medics disappeared that day.
8. On November 8th, 1944 we sent two large groups of walking wounded to rear guided by our enlisted medics. One of the guides, Pvt. Passalacqua killed by shell fragments. Another was wounded. The guides reported that one or two of the patients from every group of walking wounded we sent to the rear were killed enroute by shell fragments or snipers. No litter patients were evacuated. That night about 40 more walking wounded arrived at our aid station. We gave them no medical attention but guided them to the rear as we had done with previous groups. The walking informed us that approximately 40 casualties on makeshift litters were enroute to our aid station from the area around Kommerscheidt. They were hauled by 160 infantrymen. Some of these Infantrymen had rifles; some were unarmed. These men informed us that they were guided to our aid station by a German patrol which guarded the bridge on the MSR about 200 yds. below our aid station. Our aid station [was] already packed with litter patients, we placed the new patients on the road by the aid station with guards holding Red Cross flags. It was raining and cold. We took all available blankets from the patients and personnel in Aid station and tried our best to cover the patients. One of the litter patients was 2nd Lt. Reed, MAC, Med. Det., 110th Inf. He informed us that all the known patients were on the litter train. We retained several of the infantry litter bearers and told them they were medics for the time being. We advised the rest to join the American troops behind us. We suggested they infiltrate in small groups. Later that night General Davis and another officer entered our aid station. Capt. DeMarco pleaded our situation. General Davis read a message he had with him. General Davis said “thank you” and left.
9. On 9 November 1944 we decided to make a desperate attempt to evacuate the litter patients in the Blue-Red aid station and on the road. Two 6 x 6 trucks were located about 200 yds. uphill from our aid station. These were supposedly left there by kitchen personnel. The German patrol had made a road block by felling several trees across the narrow road. Lt. Morrison contacted the engineers who removed the road block and mines. The road was too slippery to back the trucks to the aid station, so we carried the patients to the trucks, removed them from the litters and packed them on the trucks. We loaded about 19 patients per truck. We also found 5 cans of gasoline. The Germans had already captured all or [our] medical vehicles but one weasel which had several holes in its tank but still serviceable. The weasel was also loaded with patients. About this time Horseshoe Surgeon arrived at the Blue-Red station. He informed us the Blue battalion had withdrawn, that he would contact a German officer in an effort to make a 4 hour trace to evacuate patients, and that we should withdraw after all patients we evacuated. He returned stating that several American tanks blocked the narrow MSR near the entrance but he would make an effort to get out with the
4
weasel and its load of patients. This he did with Tec 3 Shedio. As the gasoline tank continually leaked, it was necessary for Shedio to pour gasoline into it as they drove along. About 1615 Lt. Johnson arrived with 8 ambulances from Coll. Co. A and C. All personnel acted as litter bearers to unload the two trucks of patients and those in the dugout.
10. About 1400 an enlisted Medic from Med. Det. 110th Inf. informed Capt. DeMarco that there were was a German Captain by the truckloads of patients and wanted to see the Surgeon in charge. I accompanied Capt. DeMarco. We saluted the German Officer and he returned a military salute. About ten other German soldiers were there. Result of the conversation was that we could evacuate the seriously wounded and medical personnel but linemen that were around and all the light wounded would have to be prisoners. I tried to send a runner to the few linemen who had acted as litter bearers to inform them of the situation but was informed that they had already surrendered to the enemy. While the other officers worked on unloading the trucks, Capt. Linguiti, Chaplains Madden and Mainess and I remained at the dugout to guide the evacuation there. We acted as litter bearers for the last patient to arrive at the ambulance post. Part way up the hill we were exhausted. Lt. Johnson then took the front end of the litter and I the rear. As we passed the trucks, I heard someone say that we still had five more patients to be loaded from the trucks. A few feet ahead about a dozen Germans were talking to Capt. DeMarco. The other officers were there too. It was muddy and slippery as I passed them, Lt. Johnson was now the rear litter bearer; another enlisted man and I were front litter bearers. At the top of the hill I slipped. A German soldier took my left hand and pulled until we were on the road. After the litter patient was loaded, a Lieut. whom I was later told was from Coll. Co. C, exclaimed, “Get in there, they want you too.” I soon gathered from the patients that the Germans had changed their minds and did not want the Medical Officers to leave. A man from the last ambulance to leave stated he saw the Germans and our four officers head in the direction of the Blue-Red aid station and that Chaplain Madden had shouted “Come back for us tomorrow.” I stayed at C Co. Coll,103rd Med Bn. that night and learned that all the ambulances had gotten through safely.
ALFRED J. MUGLIA
2nd.Lt. MAC 112th Inf.
3rd Bn. Surgeons Asst.
2d Lt. Henry W. Morrison, Medical Administrative Corps, Medical Detachment, 112th Infantry Regiment, “Report of Medical Evacuation,” 11 November 1944.
Medical Detachment, 112th Infantry Regimnet, APO 28, U.S. Army, 11 November 1944
MEDICAL DETACHMENT, 112th INFANTRY REGIMENT
APO 28, U.S. ARMY
11 November 1944
SUBJECT: Report or Medical Evacuation
TO: Division Surgeon, 28th Div., APO 28, U. S. Army.
1. On 2 November 1944, Red. Bn. [1st Battalion] of 112th Inf. crossed the LOD. [Line of Departure]. Casualties were few and evacuation wan satisfactory by use of an ambulance loading post located at Horseshoe Med installation (015331=). All casualties were evacuated from Red Aid station to the loading post by Red Medical personnel and a weasel attached to Red medical section.
2. On 3 November 1944 at 1630 Red Aid Station had moved to Vossenack and set up for approximately one hour during which time all casualties were evacuated thru the Blue advance loading post which they had set up earlier in the day.
3. 1730 Red aid station started to advance cross country to Kommerschidt [Kommerscheidt], following behind Red Infantry troops with medical personnel and weasel hauling trailer with medical equipment. At (043316) the weasel could go no further because of the terrain features ahead. Five men then took the medical supplies forward by use of pack boards. The Red aid station proceeded to (055309) and set up at this point, the time approximately 2300.
4. 4 November 1944 -- Red aid station was located at same spot and the collection and treatment of casualties were carried on at this spot. No connections were made between Coll. Co. and Red aid. station during this date but four Horseshoe medical men arrived at Red aid station at 1800 and departed at 1900 with 7 walking wounded. The wounded were evacuated by vehicle (ambulance) from Blue aid station then located at (046316). Litter casualties had to be kept in Red aid station overnight.
5. 5 November 1944 -- Red. supply train carrying supplies came to Red troops came to Red aid station after unloading and carried all but 3 casualties from this station to Blue aid station where they were evacuated from by Coll. Co. vehicle. During the morning Red aid station was visited by Lt. Page and Capt. Wickens of Coll. Co. along with one litter team of the same organization. During their visit the Aid station was hit by German artillery and some of Coll. men were wounded, also Lt. Muglia with 3 litter bearers were present, all the litter bearers were wounded and one killed by the blast.
6. 1500 — Red Medical Jeeps (2) along with 2 jeeps and one weasel from Blue aid station arrived and casualties were evacuated by these vehicles. During this date two more direct hits were made on Red Station.
7. 1730 — I (Lt. H. W. Morrison, MAC) set out to make a recon. for a safer location for Red aid station during this recon I delivered 3 casualties from Red aid station to Blue station and decide to consolidate the two aid stations at Blue location. I returned to Red station and at this time all casualties left in Red station were loaded and taken to blue
SOURCE: National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 407, Records of The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Combat Interviews (CI-76), 28th Infantry Division, Hürtgen Forest Campaign, Box 24032.
2
station. All Red personnel except 8 litter bearers moved to blue station. The plan was to have the 2 litter teams to collect casualties at Kommerschidt [Kommerscheidt] and then evacuate them to new aid station by use of Red and blue vehicles.
8. 0100 ?? German patrols surrounded the new aid station site and practically wiped out American troops in the sector. The enemy troops mined the MSR only vehicle route to front line troops and casualty collecting point. During the afternoon and evening engineer troops of the 1340 Eng. (Co. C) cleared road of mines but not early enough for evacuation by vehicle. The only casualties evacuated during this date were walking wounded guided back to white Aid station by Red and Blue personnel. From White aid station they could be evacuated by Coll. Co. ambulance.
9. 8 November 1944 -- 0400 — German troops again attacked thru the area of Red and Blue stations. One Squad stopped at aid station to inquire the type of installation it was and offered rations or any supplies we might need. They explained that as long as no fire arms were around the aid station they would not fire on the installation. At 1100 I with Sgt. of Blue section set out by foot for Regimental Medical section to explain the situation to the Regimental Surgeon, after doing so we returned to our aid station.
10. 0430 -- Lt. Johnson with two weasels and Lt. Page with litter bearers from Coll. Co. arrived at aid station. The weasels were left at top of hill near the station casualties were we carried to vehicle by litters, during the loading process the vehicles and men were fired on by the enemy but in my opinion only because the enemy could not see the red coresses. (Red Crosses). Two casualties were deserted and were found at top of hill the next morning. 7 November 1944 — during this date Coll. Co. did not contact our station once and again the only wounded evacuated were walking wounded guided by aid station personnel. 8 November 1944 -- During this date only walking wounded were evacuated.
11. 9 November 1944 -- I contacted. the engineers and requested them to check MSR up hill for mines, to remove road blocks, and to check 2 GMC trucks for booby traps. My plan to use same for evacuation of all patients, total of which were approximately 54. Aid station personnel loaded the trucks and one weasel. The trucks were driven to top at hill where the MSR was found to be blocked by American tanks and other vehicles that were knocked out by the enemy. The Regimental Surgeon was present at the time and together we could figure out no way to get the trucks out. He continued on his way to try to for a truce so that the casualties might be evacuated safely. I had the drivers of the trucks pull the vehicles over to the edge of the road and clear a way thru for the weasel, which we, (myself and Sgt Shedio) started on our way back with one litter case and four loss serious cases. We arrived at White’s old site which at this time was being used by 109th Inf Medics. There I found the Regimental Surgeon, Lt. Johnson and other Coll. Co. personnel. I explained how I had gotten thru and further steps were immediately taken by proper authorities. I returned. to Horseshoe aid station with the Regimental Surgeon and later heard of how an ambulance train had evacuated the casualties with the aid of some Germans and that the 2 Medical officers and Chaplains were held by the enemy.
[signed]
HENRY W. MORRISON
2nd Lt, MAC, 112th Inf
1st Lt. Loyd C. Johnson, Medical Administrative Corps, Company C, 103d Medical Battalion, 28th Infantry Division, “Casualty Evacuation Report,” n.d.
Casualty Evacuation Report
CASUALTY EVACUATION REPORT
1st Lt. Loyd Johnson
The main function of an ambulance platoon is the evacuation of casualties between the Battalion Aid Stations through Collecting Company to Clearing Company. The information contained herein will be concerned chiefly with this activity.
Usually evacuation is a routine process with one ambulance remaining at each Aid Station and difficulty is encountered only when a road network is impassable, or incomplete from the forward to the rear evacuation points. A difficult situation of this type was encountered on the 4th of Nov. when the Red Aid Station, located at Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] could not evacuate in the routine manner. The customary evacuation ceased at an A. L. P. at 045138 because the narrow and very precipitous road leading into the valley between Vossenach [Vossenack] and Kommerscheid [Kommerscheidt] could not be negotiated by ambulance. This situation necessitated setting up a system of evacuation beginning thusly:
1. Collecting Company at Zweifall with an A. R. P. at the White Aid Station located at the old German Barracks at 022329.
2. An ambulance shuttle from 022329 to the A. L. P. at the top of the hill at 045318.
3. Blue Aid Station located approxima
